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Abstract 
Accurate metacognitive judgements are necessary to predict the likelihood of 
recalling information and engage in effective learning. The study explored how 
manipulating JOL question frame and the scale of assessment affected metacognitive 
accuracy. Ninety-Two participants (59 female) aged 18-69 (M = 27.58, SD = 12.56) 
completed a cued-recall task of sixty-six English noun word-pairs and made JOLs. 
The method of JOL assessment (0-100% scale or binary task) and the frame of the 
JOL question (likelihood of remembering or forgetting) were manipulated to form 
four between-subjects conditions. The study-JOL-recall procedure was repeated to 
form two test cycles. Framing had a minimal impact on JOLs when measured on 0-
100% scales. For binary conditions, the effects of framing differed depending on test 
cycle. It was concluded framing effects may result from the selection of different 
anchors, and that binary tasks may be more sensitive to framing. This study has 
implications for how health professional, educators, and researchers may consider 
assessing the beliefs about memory of those they teach. The study highlights the way 
assessments are made can influence the accuracy of metacognitive beliefs. Hence 
further research into and development of methods to accurately assess metacognition 
in both laboratory and real-world settings is necessary.  
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 The accuracy with which people determine whether or not they will recall 
information in the future can affect learning efficacy (Metcalfe & Finn, 2008). For 
example, overconfidence in predicted memory performance can result in ceasing 
study before fully understanding materials (Finn, 2008). Predicting memory 
performance requires metacognition (Kelly & Donaldson, 2016). Metacognition is 
the ability to think about one’s thinking, encompassing processes such as monitoring 
comprehension, reflecting on learning, and assessing the efficacy of other cognitive 
abilities (Kelly & Donaldson, 2016). Judgements of learning (JOLs) are a type of 
metacognitive task which involves predicting the likelihood of future remembering 
(Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991;Undorf, Böhm, & Cüpper, 2015). 
 JOLs may influence study decisions (Metcalfe & Finn, 2008), meaning the 
accuracy of these judgements can affect learning efficacy. For example, student’s 
JOLs can affect their judgment of which areas need more study and which have been 
learnt sufficiently (Metcalfe & Finn, 2008). Hence student’s may incorrectly believe 
further study is not required if JOLs are overconfident. The potential negative 
implications of inaccurate judgements apply in many settings, including judging 
memory for health information or predicting performance during important 
educational tests. Improving the accuracy of metacognitive judgements is therefore 
important to ensure accurate monitoring of information retention and facilitate 
learning.  
 JOL accuracy can be assessed by analysing resolution, calibration and 
over/underconfidence. Resolution (relative accuracy) is the ability to distinguish 
between items which will and will not be recalled (Zawadzka & Higham, 2015). 
Calibration (absolute accuracy) is how well mean JOLs match overall memory 
performance (Zawadzka & Higham, 2015). By assessing calibration, it is possible to 
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determine if judgements were overconfident (JOL > performance), underconfident 
(JOL < performance), or accurate (JOL = performance) (Hanczakowski, Zawadzka, 
Pasek, & Higham, 2013). Over/underconfidence is a measure which indicates how 
overconfident or underconfident judgements were (Jonsson & Allwood, 2003). 
 JOLs can be made immediately following the presentation of each item 
(immediate JOLs) or delayed until after multiple items have been presented (delayed 
JOLs) (van Loon, de Bruin, van Gog, & van Merrienboer, 2013). Making JOLs after 
a delay has been found to improve metacognitive accuracy compared to immediate 
JOLs (van Loon et al., 2013). Differences between immediate and delayed JOL 
accuracy have been attributed to the type of memory each judgement relies upon. 
Delayed JOLs likely have greater reliance on long-term memory (Kvavilashvili & 
Ford, 2014; Schneider, Visé, Lockl, & Nelson, 2000). Hence these decisions can be 
more predictive of memory performance when recalling information is not required 
immediately after information presentation (Schneider et al., 2000). This means a 
simple way to improve JOL accuracy could be to delay judgements.  
 Although metacognitive accuracy improves following delayed JOLs, this 
practice may not be applicable in some real-world settings. For example, it would be 
impractical and time consuming for busy health professionals to assess client’s 
likelihood of remembering information hours after the information was presented. A 
better method could be to ensure health information has been learnt and understood 
immediately after it is presented. In doing so, the health professional can either 
confirm necessary information has been learnt, or to continue to educate the client 
until understanding has been achieved. Hence this study aims to investigate ways to 
improve JOL accuracy for judgements made immediately after information 
presentation.  
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Manipulating Framing 
 The impacts of changing question wording on participant’s responses has 
been observed within decision-making literature. For example, Prospect Theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) suggests the way information is framed can impact 
decision-making. People may view potential resource gains and losses as 
psychologically different, with potential loses attracting greater psychological weight 
than potential gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Decisions framed as potential 
loses result in the selection of higher risk options. For example, participants may be 
given $40 and asked to choose between either giving back $10, or making a 50%-
50% bet to losing $20 or losing everything. In this condition, participants choose the 
risky (betting) option. In comparison, framing choices as potential gains results in 
the selection of less risky options. For example, participants may be given $20 and 
asked to choose between either being given an extra $10, or making a 50%-50% bet 
to winning an additional $20 or losing everything. In this case, participants select the 
first option as it is less risky. Framing decisions as a potential gain therefore 
increases risk aversion to minimise resource loss. This effect is found despite all 
options having rewards of the same magnitude (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Hence 
framing may influence decision-making.  
 Like decision-making, metacognitive accuracy can be affected by question 
frame (Finn, 2008; Serra & England, 2012). JOLs are typically assessed using a 
remember frame; that is, participants are asked the likelihood of remembering 
information in the future (Finn, 2008). Yet changing this assessment from a 
remember to a forget frame (changing the question from “what is the likelihood you 
will remember?” to “what is the likelihood you will forget?”) may improve 
prediction accuracy (Finn, 2008). When comparing JOLs assessed with remember or 
 5 
 
 
 
forget frames, Finn (2008) found improved calibration and less overconfidence when 
forget frames were used. Finn also found forget frames resulted in more easy and 
medium difficulty items being selected for restudy, despite equivalent performance 
between frames on the memory test. The region of proximal learning model 
(Metcalfe & Kornell, 2005) suggests learning is best when easy and medium 
difficulty information is mastered before difficult information (Xu & Metcalfe, 
2016). Finn therefore suggest selecting these items for restudy indicates more 
adaptive learning choices. This finding is therefore important, as forget frames may 
both improve judgements about future memory performance and increase adaptive 
study behaviours.  
 Using forget frames to assess immediate JOLs may improve metacognitive 
accuracy and have positive behavioural consequences (Finn, 2008). Finn (2008) 
suggested this occurs because framing can promote reliance on different cues to 
make JOLs. That is, framing changes the metacognitive context and affects decisions 
about which memory cues to utilise (Serra & England, 2012). Forget frames were 
suggested to improve JOL accuracy and decreasing overconfidence by heightening 
sensitivity to cues about memory fallibility and memory decay over time (Finn, 
2008). Finn’s idea therefore suggests forget frames allow people to monitor learning 
and information loss more effectively, rather than simply biasing responses.  
 More recent research indicates the effects of framing may not be as simple as 
Finn (2008) suggests. Serra and England (2012) also investigated the effects of 
framing on immediate JOL accuracy, although with some procedural changes. In 
Finn’s study, JOLs were only assessed once. This meant participants studied and 
underwent JOL assessments for each piece of information, then completed a memory 
test. Serra and England used a multi-cycle design. A multi-cycle design repeats the 
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procedure of a single cycle design so that study, JOL assessments, and memory tests 
are completed multiple times. Use of multi-cycle design revealed remember frames 
were well calibrated in the first cycle, but became underconfident on the second. 
Forget frames were overconfident on the first cycle, yet became well calibrated on 
the second. This conflicts with Finn’s results.  
 Differences in calibration depending on cycle may suggest framing does not 
alter sensitivity to cues about memory fallibility or memory decay. Instead, Serra and 
England (2012) theorised framing may promote reliance on different anchors. The 
anchoring hypothesis (Scheck & Nelson, 2005) proposes an anchor is a value formed 
during initial JOL assessments. This anchor represents a point on a continuum above 
which information is considered recallable, and below which it is considered 
unrecallable (Hanczakowski et al., 2013). The value of this anchor depends on 
factors such as beliefs about memory when making the initial JOL, and the 
experimental or task requirements (Scheck & Nelson, 2005). The anchor becomes 
the base from which later JOLs are made, with people shifting judgement up or 
down from the anchor depending on their beliefs about future recall (Hanczakowski 
et al., 2013). Anchoring effects mean JOLs often change little upon retesting (Scheck 
& Nelson, 2005). This effect is compounded by use of a stability bias; the belief 
memory is stable over time and will not improve with learning or suffer from 
forgetting (Kornell & Bjork, 2009).  
 To test the potential relationship between anchoring and framing, Serra and 
England (2012) compared differences between JOLs and a second order judgment 
(SOJ) indicating confidence in the accuracy of each JOL. JOLs move away from 
anchors as more information about potential memory performance is acquired 
(Dunlosky, Serra, Matvey, & Rawson, 2005). Likewise, SOJs increase when more 
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information is available (indicating greater confidence), but remain close to anchors 
when less information is available (Dunlosky et al., 2005). Lower SOJs can therefore 
indicate when JOLs are closer to anchors (Serra & England, 2012). Based on 
difference between JOL and SOJ by frame, it was concluded forget frames result in 
anchors around the midpoint (50%). Remember frames were suggested to be 
anchored lower, between 20% and 40%. Thus, differences observed between frames 
may result from anchoring rather than sensitivity to cues regarding memory 
fallibility (Serra & England, 2012).  
 In contrast to both Finn (2008), and Serra and England (2012), there is 
research suggesting framing does not affect the calibration of metacognitive 
decisions. Rhodes and Castel (2008) compared metacognitive accuracy for words 
written in either a small or large font size. JOLs were defined as assessments which 
used a remember frame. Forget frame decisions were defined as judgements of 
forgetting (JOFs). JOFs converted to the same scale as JOLs by reverse scoring 
JOFs. Judgements of remembering and forgetting were found to result in equivalent 
predicted memory performance. Hence framing was not found to influence 
metacognitive accuracy (Rhodes & Castel, 2008). It is therefore possible framing 
does not affect JOL accuracy.  
 A final finding regarding the effect of framing on metacognition relates to the 
ability to distinguish between information that will or will not be recalled in the 
future (resolution). Both Finn (2008) and Rhodes and Castel (2008) found minimal 
differences in resolution between frames. However, Serra and England (2012) extend 
on this finding by demonstrating forget frame JOLs may have poorer resolution than 
remember frame JOLs in addition test cycles. This difference was suggested to occur 
as forget frames reduce reliance on the memory for past test (MPT) heuristic. The 
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MPT heuristic suggests people consider performance during initial testing to infer 
memory performance for the same information during secondary testing (Serra & 
Ariel, 2014). Reliance on the MPT heuristic has been associated with improvements 
in metacognitive accuracy, and has been used to explain why resolution improves 
across test cycles (Finn & Metcalfe, 2008; Serra & Ariel, 2014). As observed by 
Serra and England, reduced use of the MPT heuristic in cycle two of forget frames 
would therefore result in poorer resolution in forget than remember frames. As other 
framing studies have not considered multiple cycles (Finn, 2008; Rhodes and Castel, 
2008), further investigation of Serra and England’s idea decreased use of the MPT 
heuristic within forget frames promotes differences in resolution.   
 
Limitations of Framing Research    
 Framing research is currently limited to a small number of studies. These 
studies conflict greatly, meaning a pattern of effects has not been established. There 
is also variation in hypotheses as to why framing effects may or may not occur. 
While Finn (2008) suggests framing may influence the cues used to predict recall, 
Serra and England’s (2012) research indicates framing may instead alter anchoring. 
More research is necessary before either theory can be supported.  
 One way to investigate why framing occurs could be to examine the effects 
of framing on different scales. There is some research suggesting one method of 
assessing JOLs is affected by factors altering confidence in recall, while another 
assessment method is minimally affected by confidence (Hanczakowski et al., 2013). 
If framing effects were present on both scales, this may indicate framing results from 
the utilisation of different memory cues. Hence framing may improve the ability to 
accurately predict recall. Framing effects on only the scale affected by confidence 
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would suggest framing might result from anchoring effects. As such, this would 
suggest framing does not improve the accuracy of metacognitive judgements.  
 
The Effects of Scale Type 
 JOLs are commonly assessed using 0-100% scales. 0-100% scales require 
participants to rate JOLs on a scale from 0 (no likelihood of remembering) to 100 
(absolute likelihood of remembering) (Hanczakowski et al., 2013). Alternatively, 
JOLs can be assessed using binary tasks. Binary tasks simply requires a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
response to a question assessing whether information is likely to be remembered in 
the future (Hanczakowski et al., 2013).  
 It has been assumed both scales measure an individual’s subjective beliefs 
about the probability of information recall (Hanczakowski et al., 2013). However, 
recent research suggests this is not the case. As observed by Hanczakowski, 
Zawadzka, Pasek, and Higham, (2013) when investigating the underconfidence with 
practice (UWP) effect, scale type may influence the calibration of immediate JOLs. 
The UWP effect occurs when JOLs are overconfident on initial testing, yet fail to 
improve to the same extend memory does during later testing (Zawadzka & Higham, 
2015). Interestingly, Hanczakowski et al. found the UWP effect was present when 0-
100% scales were used, but absent for binary tasks. This suggests scale type 
influences JOL accuracy, and may indicate one scale does not assess beliefs about 
recall probability. More recent research by Zawadzka and Higham (2015) has also 
found scale type influences calibration, supporting this notion.  
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Theoretical Accounts of Scale Effects   
 The cause of scale effects remains unclear. Research by Zawadzka and 
Higham (2015) suggests variations in JOL accuracy do not simply result from 
differing scale format. Factors including differences in the number of response 
options (binary tasks have two response options, while there are multiple options for 
0-100% scales) and use of numerical labels in 0-100% scales have not been found to 
influence JOL accuracy (Zawadzka & Higham, 2015). These factors are therefore 
suggested not to produce differences in JOL accuracy between scales.  
 A plausible explanation of scale differences was proposed by Hanczakowski 
et al. (2013). Scale differences may occur because the scales changed the 
interpretation of the JOL question. It was suggested either a confidence or 
probability interpretation could be made. 0-100% scales were suggested to promote 
confidence interpretations, whereby people make a yes-no decision about the 
probability of recall and use the scale to make an ordinal ranking of confidence. An 
item assigned the value of 80% therefore does not indicate an 80% likelihood of 
recall. Rather, this is a ranking indicating greater confidence in recall when 
compared to lower ranked items. 0-100% scales may therefore be susceptible to cues 
which affect confidence in memory such as the UWP effect. Data obtained from 0-
100% scales may therefore indicate confidence rather than the probability of recall.  
 In comparison, binary tasks were suggested to promote probability 
interpretations. Under these interpretations, answers were suggested to directly index 
the individual’s subjective beliefs about the probability of an outcome. Binary tasks 
may therefore be a more accurate measure, as the interpretation of JOLs often relies 
on JOLs representing probability rather than confidence information (Hanczakowski 
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et al., 2013). This idea may explain why binary tasks were not affected by the UWP 
effect within Hanczakowski et al.’s (2013) research.  
 It should be noted that unlike framing effects, scale type may not alter 
psychological processes. In particular, processes such as the use of certain cognitive 
biases, or the ability to discriminate between what is and is not known  may be 
unaffected by scale type (Hanczakowski et al., 2013). Instead, it is probable scales 
simply alter the ability to express beliefs about memory. Hanczakowski et al. (2013) 
explored this idea by asking participants to make JOLs on a 0-100% scale, 
immediately followed by making JOLs on a binary task. Participants displayed 
underconfident JOLs when using the 0-100% scale, but did not show 
underconfidence when completing the binary task for the same information only 
moments later. It is unlikely participant’s beliefs about the likelihood of recall would 
change in the few moments between assessments. It is therefore suggested scales 
alter how decisions are expressed rather than information monitoring.   
  
Limitations of Scale Effect Research  
 Research on differences between 0-100% scales and binary tasks is currently 
limited to a small number of studies. Due to this, more research is needed before it is 
possible to determine whether 0-100% scales, binary tasks, or other methods of 
assessment may provide the most accurate information. More research is also needed 
to assess the validity of Hanczakowski et al.’s (2013) theory on differences between 
probability and confidence interpretations. For this reason, the present study aims to 
add to this body of research by comparing the accuracy of JOLs made using 0-100% 
scales and binary tasks.  
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Aims  
 One aim of the current study was to investigate how framing may impact 
metacognitive accuracy. Few studies have investigated framing. In addition, the 
results of these studies conflict greatly. More research is therefore necessary to 
establish a pattern of effects. Therefore, the first aim of the present study was to help 
clarify conflicting research on how manipulating frame may impact metacognitive 
accuracy.  
Investigating the effect of manipulating framing on multiple scales may help 
achieve this aim. As noted by Hanczakowski et al. (2013), differing interpretations 
of JOL questions may mean it is inappropriate to suggest a manipulation affects JOL 
accuracy if impacts are only seen on one scale. Conclusions about the effect of 
manipulating frame may therefore be inaccurate if the effect on both scales is not 
considered. As previous studies have considered the impact of framing on 0-100% 
scales only (Finn, 2008; Rhodes & Castel, 2008; Serra & England, 2012), a second 
aim of the study was to investigate whether there would be converging results of 
framing on both scales. 
A final aim was to explore possible causes of framing effects. Investigating 
whether framing differs depending on scales may provide additional information 
about why framing effects occur. Using Hanczakowski et al. (2013) suggestion 0-
100% scales are influenced by factors affecting confidence, framing may be found 
on 0-100% scales but have minimal influence on binary measures. This may suggest 
framing affects confidence or changes the anchors used rather than cues about 
memory fallibility. This would align with Serra and England’s (2012) anchoring 
theory of framing. Framing effects on both scales would support Finn’s (2008) 
suggestion framing affects the cues used in memory decisions (cf. simply altering 
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confidence in memory). An absence of framing effects would support Rhodes and 
Castel’s (2008) finding framing has minimal effect on metacognitive accuracy.  
 
Hypotheses  
The UWP effect was predicted to occur on 0-100% scales but not on binary 
measures. This would support the research of Hanczakowski et al. (2013), providing 
additional evidence the interpretation of the JOL question may differ depending on 
the scale used. The effect of framing may replicate previous research. The finding 
forget frames promote greater JOL accuracy on both scales would support the 
research of Finn (2008), suggesting forget frames promote the use of more predictive 
memory cues. Alternatively, framing may influence anchoring, as predicted by Serra 
and England (2012). Should this occur, it is expected manipulating frame would 
have larger impacts on 0-100% scales, as these scales promote confidence 
interpretations of the JOL question. No effect of framing on either scale would 
support research by Rhodes and Castel (2008).  
 
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-five participants completed the study. Two were removed due to 
missing data. A third participant was removed after reporting incorrect use of the 
JOL measure, leaving a final sample of 92 participants (59 female) aged 18 to 69 (M 
= 27.55, SD = 12.57). This conforms with minimum of 20-30 people per cell 
suggested necessary to reduce the risk of false positive results (Simmons, Nelson, & 
Simonsohn, 2011). Using G*Power software (Version 3.1.9.2; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, 
& Buchner, 2007), a total sample size of 76 was suggested necessary to identify a 
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moderate effect. Hence the achieved sample size is also consistent with tests of 
necessary sample size. Twenty-eight participants were undergraduate psychology 
students from the University of Tasmania. The remaining participants were drawn 
from the broader Launceston population. Participants were recruited using posters 
displayed at the Newnham campus of the University of Tasmania and online. 
Participants either received course credit or were financially remunerated $20 for 
their time. 
 
Design 
A 2 ×2 ×2 mixed design with four between-subjects conditions was used. 
Scale (0-100% scale or binary task) and Frame (forget or remember frame) were 
between subjects variables, while Test Cycle (cycle one or cycle two) was a within 
subjects variable. These four conditions have been referred to as scale-remember (n 
= 21), scale-forget (n = 22), binary-remember (n = 27), and binary-forget (n = 22).  
 
 
Figure 1: Experimental procedure (multicycle design). 
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Cycle One 
Distractor task 
15 + ?  = 48  
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JOLs 
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Distractor task 
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Cycle Two 
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Cat - ?  
 
End   
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Materials and Procedure 
 Participants were randomly allocated to conditions using a random number 
generator. LimeSurvey (Version 2.06; Schmitz, 2015) was used to implement the 
experiment. Tasks were undertaken individually on a computer. Participants were 
provided with a verbal overview of the task. They were informed they would be 
undergoing a memory task which required the learning a list of pairs of words, and 
later completing a memory test. Participants were verbally informed they would be 
asked to make judgements about their expected performance during the test for each 
word-pair, and instructed on how to make these judgements depending on the 
condition they were in. All instructions were also provided in writing. Information 
sheets and consent forms were then presented and completed using LimeSurvey 
(Appendix B). After providing consent, participants began the study. Demographic 
information including age, sex, current enrolment in first year psychology classes, 
and whether English was their first language was collected (Appendix C).  
 The experiment was designed to closely follow the method of both previous 
framing and scale studies. As can be seen within Figure 1, participants completed a 
cued recall task over two study-test cycles. Cued recall tasks have previously been 
used in both framing (Finn, 2008; Serra & England, 2012) and scale effect studies 
(Hanczakowski et al., 2013; Zawadzka & Higham, 2015). Sixty-six English non-
associated word-pairs were presented (Appendix D). These pairs have previously 
been used within framing research (Serra, Dunlosky, & Hertzog, 2008; Serra & 
England, 2012). Two randomised lists of word-pairs were constructed. The first list 
was presented in cycle one. The second list was presented in cycle two. The 
presentation order of word-pairs was the same for the study and recall phases of each 
cycle. The presentation and study order of word-pairs was the same for all 
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conditions. Following the method of Hanczakowski et al. (2013), and Zawadzka & 
Higham (2015), each pair was presented for 3.5 seconds. The first three and last 
three pairs were included as buffers to control primacy and recency effects (Rhodes 
& Castel, 2008). These 6 pairs were not included in the analysis.   
 JOLs were assessed immediately following the presentation of each pair. 
Hence a word-pair was presented, the JOL for that pair made, followed by the 
presentation of the next word-pair. During JOL assessments, the first (cue) word was 
presented while the second (target) word was replaced with a question mark. JOL 
instructions were specific to the condition. Instructions were framed in terms of 
either remembering or forgetting. Differences also existed between scale conditions. 
Those in the 0-100% scale conditions were asked “How likely are you are to 
(remember/forget) the second word in the pair in a few minutes from now?”, where 
0% indicated not likely to remember/forget and 100% indicated likely to 
remember/forget. To respond, participants moved a marker on a bar to indicate a 
number between 0 and 100. The marker appeared in the middle of the bar (50) for 
each JOL. This method was selected to remove errors such as entering values outside 
of the 0-100 range, which could occur if people were able to type responses. It was 
also considered a more sensitive measure, allowing finer grain distinctions than 
simply selecting between response options at each 10%. The binary conditions were 
presented with the statement: “Are you likely to (remember/forget) the second word 
in the pair in a few minutes from now?” Participants responded either “yes” or “no” 
by clicking the relevant response button. Again, this method was considered superior 
to typed responses as it prevents typing mistakes. JOL response time was not limited. 
Participants pressed “next” to move to the next word-pair.  
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 A mathematics filler task was completed for two minutes following the 
presentation of all word-pairs. Participants were given 18 questions of increasing 
difficulty (e.g. 3 × ? + 11 = 41) and asked to answer as many as possible. No 
participant completed all questions in the allocated time. This task was included to 
prevent item rehearsal before the test period, and ensure working memory was not 
being assessed.  
 Following the filler task, participants underwent a recall test. Participants 
were required to type the target word when the relevant cue word was presented. 
Participants pressed “next” to move onto the next cue word. Participants could type 
“x” if they could not recall the correct response. This was scored as incorrect. The 
study-JOL-test procedure was then repeated to form a second test cycle.  
 
Results 
 IBM SPSS Statistics version 25 was used to test assumptions and analyse 
data. The effects of manipulating framing and scales on cue-recall performance and 
JOLs were examined. Following this, a series of mixed ANOVAs and tests of simple 
main effects were conducted to examine the effects of manipulations on 
metacognitive accuracy. As within previous framing studies, forget JOLs were 
converted to the same scale as remember JOLs by subtracting the JOL value from 
100. Partial eta squared has been reported as an indication of effect size for 
interactions. For pairwise comparisons, Cohen’s d has been calculated. Values of 
0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 represent a small, moderate, and a large effect respectively (Cohen, 
1988). Exploratory Software for Confidence Intervals (ESCI) was used to calculate 
95% confidence intervals for Cohen’s d (Cumming, 2012). Descriptive statistics are 
displayed separately for each cycle in Table 1 and Table 2.  
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Tests of Assumptions 
 Z-scores were calculated to identify outliers. Scores above 3.29 were 
considered potential univariate outliers (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Analyses were 
rerun, and results with and without outliers compared. As removal of outliers did not 
change effects, they were included within the final analysis. Inspection of 
histograms, boxplots, and the skewness statistic (Shipiro-Wilk’s test) indicated the 
assumption of normality was met. Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were considered 
unnecessary as there were only 2 levels of each independent variable. Results did not 
differ by sex, enrolment in first year psychology, or between participants for whom 
English was or was not their first language.  
Table 1:: Means and Standard Deviations for Cycle One 
Means and Standard Deviations for Cycle One 
Recall Mean JOL Resolution
M(SD) M(SD) M(SD)
Remember 23.26 (20.86) 36.36 (20.74) 0.07 (0.11)
Forget 26.60 (20.72) 39.18 (17.38) 0.09 (0.09)
Total 24.97 (20.61) 37.80 (18.92) 0.08 (0.10)
Remember 23.65 (18.18) 48.70 (27.48) 0.08 (0.10)
Forget 28.72 (23.50) 30.83 (21.30) 0.10 (0.12)
Total 25.92 (20.67) 40.68 (26.23) 0.09 (0.11)
Total
Remember 23.48 (19.18) 43.30 (25.28) 0.08 (0.10)
Forget 27.66 (21.92) 35.01 (19.70) 0.10 (0.10)
Total 25.48 (20.53) 39.34 (23.09) 0.09 (0.10)
 0-100% Scale
Binary 
Note:  M  = Mean. SD  = Standard deviation. 
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Recall Performance 
“Recall” refers to memory performance on the recall components of the 
study. Higher scores indicate a greater percentage of words were correctly 
remembered during the recall test (better memory performance). Recall was 
expected to increase between cycle one and two, as the testing effect suggests 
additional learning and tests of information should promote greater recall in the 
second cycle (Karpicke & Roediger, 2008; Dunlosky, Rawson, Marsh, Nathan, 
Willingham, 2013). A paired samples t-test was used to determine the general pattern 
of effect for recall within the present study. Recall was significantly higher in cycle 
two than cycle one, t(91) = 20.10, p < .001, 95%CIdifference[26.41, 32.21]. This 
represented a large effect, demonstrating participant’s memory for stimuli improved 
Table 2: Means and standard deviations for cycle two. 
Means and Standard Deviations for Cycle Two 
 
Recall Mean JOL Resolution
M(SD) M(SD) M(SD)
Remember 0.52(0.30) 41.18(25.06) 0.13(0.13)
Forget 0.58(0.31) 43.76(23.32) 0.17(0.18)
Total 0.55(0.30) 42.5(23.93) 0.15(0.15)
Remember 0.54(0.27) 51.3(27.28) 0.14(0.12)
Forget 0.56(0.31) 42.80(31.84) 0.19(0.18)
Total 0.55(0.29) 47.48(29.41) 0.16(0.15)
Total
Remember 0.53(0.28) 46.87(26.55) 0.14(0.12)
Forget 0.57(0.30) 43.28(27.59) 0.18(0.18)
Total 0.55(0.30) 45.15(26.96) 0.16(0.15)
 0-100% Scale
Binary 
Note:  M  = Mean. SD  = Standard deviation. 
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with additional learning, d = 1.16, 95%CI[0.89, 1.42]. This finding is consistent with 
previous research (Hanczakowski et al., 2013; Serra & England, 2012).  
 
JOLs 
JOL values indicate the mean JOLs for each condition. As forget and 
remember JOLs have been converted to the same scale, higher JOLs indicate better 
predicted memory performance. A paired samples t-test was used to investigate the 
overall differences in JOLs between cycles. JOLs were significantly higher in cycle 
two than cycle one, although this represented a small effect, t(91) = 2.65, p = .009, 
95%CIdifference[1.46, 10.18], d = 0.23, 95%CI[0.02, 0.44]. This finding indicates 
participants predicted they would have better memory performance in cycle two than 
cycle one. This is consistent with previous research by Koriat (1997) and 
Hanczakowski et al. (2013). 
Additionally, independent sample t-tests with Bonferroni adjustment (α = 
.025) were used to investigate whether initial JOLs differed between frames. These 
tests were used as an indication of whether frames may promote the adoption of 
different anchors. Initial JOLs did not differ by frame when measured by 0-100% 
scales, but did differ on binary tasks. There was a small and non-significant 
difference between initial remember (M = 36.36, SD = 20.74) and forget frame JOLs 
(M = 39.18, SD = 17.38) when measured on a 0-100% scale, t(41) = -.485, p = .630, 
95%CIdifference[-14.59, 8.94], d = 0.15, 95%CI[-0.45, 0.75]. However, initial JOLs 
were significantly lower within forget frames (M = 30.83, SD = 21.30) than 
remember frames (M = 48.70, SD = 27.48) when measured on a binary scale, t(47) = 
2.50, p = .016, 95%CIdifference[3.48, 32.26]. This difference represented a moderate 
effect, d = 0.72, 95%CI[0.14, 1.30]. This may indicate framing promoted the 
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adoption of lower anchors under binary-forget condition than the binary-rememeber 
condition. Hence while initial 0-100% scale JOLs did not differ by frame, initial 
binary JOLs did. As later discussed, this conflicts with Serra and England (2012).  
  
Calibration  
 Calibration and over/underconfidence (O/U statistic) are commonly 
calculated to investigate metacognitive accuracy and determine whether judgements 
were overconfident, underconfident, or accurate. However, such calculations were 
believed to be inappropriate for the current study due to potential issue with 
calculating these statistics for binary tasks. Hence the association between recall and 
JOLs was assessed using a mixed ANOVA, within which JOLs and recall were 
included as a within-subjects factor. This method has previously been used by Koriat 
(1997) and Hanczakowski et al. (2013).  
 A 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 mixed model Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) containing 
Frame (remember or forget), Scale Type (0-100% or binary), Test Cycle (cycle one 
and cycle two) and Measure (JOLs and recall) was conducted. This analysis was 
used to test whether the increase in JOLs from cycle one to cycle two corresponded 
to the increases in recall between cycles (calibration). There was a significant 
interaction between cycle and measure, F(1, 88) = 122.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .582. The 
effect of cycle therefore differed between recall and JOLs, with a greater increase in 
recall than JOLs between cycles. A larger effect size for the increase in recall (d = 
1.16) than JOLs (d = 0.23) between cycles also illustrates this difference. 
 This pattern did not differ by frame or scale, as indicated by non-significant 
three-way interactions between cycle, measure, and scale, F(1, 88) = .71, p = .402, 
ηp2 = .013, and between cycle, measure, and frame, F(1, 88) = 1.20, p = .275, ηp2 = 
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.008. The four-way interaction between cycle, measure, scale, and frame was also 
non-significant, F(1, 88) =2.93, p = .091, ηp2 = .032. This supports that while the 
increase in recall was greater than the increase in JOLs between cycle, this pattern 
did not vary by frame or scale. Hence calibration did not differ by condition. This 
pattern is illustrated within Figures 2 – 5.  
 
Confidence  
 In addition to calibration, it is important to consider the relationship between 
JOLs and recall by identifying whether manipulations promoted overconfidence, 
underconfidence, or accurate predictions of memory. By comparing JOLs to recall 
for each cycle, it is possible to determine whether participants predictions of memory 
performance were significantly overconfident (JOL > recall) or underconfident (JOL 
< recall). Small and non-significant difference between JOLs and recall indicate 
accurate predictions of memory performance. Paired samples t-tests with Bonferroni 
adjustment (α = .006) were used to examine the effect of frame separately for each 
scale and cycle.  
 Minimal differences between frames were observed when JOLs were 
measured on a 0-100% scale. Yet the UWP effect was replicated under both frames. 
For the scale-remember condition, JOLs were higher than recall in cycle one, t(20) = 
2.60, p = .017, 95%CIdifference[2.60, 23.62], but lower than recall in cycle two, t(20) = 
-2.51, p = .021, 95%CIdifference[-19.51, -1.79]. Although neither comparison was 
significant following the Bonferroni adjustment, differences did constitute a 
moderate and small effect respectively, d = 0.62, 95%CI[0.15, 1.08], and  d = 0.40, 
95%CI[-0.05, 0.82].   
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 Within the scale-forget condition, JOLs were also higher than recall in cycle 
one, t(21) = 2.37, p = .027, 95%CIdifference[1.55, 23.63], but lower than recall in cycle 
two, t(21) = -2.72, p = .013, 95%CIdifference[-24.24, -3.24]. Again, neither comparison 
was significant following the Bonferroni adjustment but each constituted a moderate 
effect, d = 0.65, 95%CI[0.18, 1.12], and d = 0.50, 95%CI[0.05, 0.94].1  As can be 
observed in Figures 2 and 3, the UWP effect was replicated on both frames within 0-
100% conditions. That is, JOLs were higher than recall (overconfident) in cycle one, 
but lower than recall (underconfident) in cycle two. Results on 0-100% scales 
therefore support the presence of the UWP effect, although this effect did not differ 
by frame.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                          
1 Bonferroni adjustments have been criticised for being too conservative (Field, 
2009). In the current example, moderate effects were considered a better indication 
of differences than non-significant p values following this correction.  
Figure 2: Remember frames when measured on a 0-100% scale. Error 
bars represent 95% confidence intervals 
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 Within binary conditions, the effect of framing differed depending on the test 
cycle. For the binary-remember condition, JOLs were significantly higher than recall 
in cycle one, t(26) = 4.54, p < .001, 95%CIdifference[13.72, 36.40]. This difference 
constituted a large effect, revealing participants in the remember condition were 
overconfident for cycle one, d = 1.08, 95%CI[0.60, 1.60]. A small and non-
significant difference between JOLs and recall in cycle two suggests judgements 
were relatively accurate for this cycle, t(26) = -0.47, p = .631, 95%CIdifference[-12.27, 
7.57], d = 0.22, 95%CI[-0.16, 0.60]. 
 For the binary-forget condition, JOLs were accurate in cycle one but 
underconfident in cycle two. A very small and non-significant difference between 
JOL and recall suggests JOLs were accurate for cycle one, t(21) = 4.54, p = .634, 
95%CIdifference[-7.02, 11.26], d = 0.09, 95%CI[-0.33, 0.51]. A moderate and 
significant difference between JOLs and recall suggests underconfidence in cycle 
Figure 3: Forget frames when measured on a 0-100% scale. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 25 
 
 
 
two JOLs, t(21) = -4.25, p < .001, 95%CIdifference[-20.08, -6.89], d = 0.43, 95%CI[-
0.01, 0.86]. Differences between frames on binary tasks can be observed in Figures 4 
and 5.  
 Overall, the UWP effect was observed on 0-100% scale JOLs with minimal 
differences between frames. Binary-remember JOLs were overconfident on the first 
cycle, but became accurate. Binary-forget JOLs were accurate in the first cycle, but 
became underconfident. Hence the UWP effect was not found in the binary-
remember condition, but a trend towards UWP was found in the binary-forget 
condition. Hence framing influenced JOL accuracy, but only when judgements were 
made using a binary task. While the increase in recall across cycles was greater than 
the increase in JOLs for all conditions, results suggest framing does affect JOLs. Yet 
as discussed later, these differences were not as predicted in the hypotheses.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Calibration of the binary-remember condition. JOLs were 
overconfident in cycle one, but accurate in cycle two. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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Resolution  
 A final analysis was conducted to investigate participants’ ability to 
discriminate between items they would and would not recall. This ability – 
resolution – was analysed by comparing Adjusted Normalised Discrimination Index 
(ANDI) scores (Yaniv, Yates, & Smith, 1991). This statistic represents the ability to 
correctly discriminate between items which will or will not be recalled. ANDI scores 
range from 0 – 1, with higher scores indicating greater discriminability. Resolution 
was found to differ between cycles, but was minimally affected by manipulations of 
frame or scale. Resolution was greater in the second cycle than the first, as indicated 
by a significant main effect of cycle, F(1, 84) = 16.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .167. The 
ability to discriminate between items that would and would not be recalled therefore 
Figure 5: Calibration of the binary-forget condition. JOLs were accurate in 
cycle one, but underconfident in cycle two. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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improved following additional exposure to information. This is constant with 
previous research (Hanczakowski et al., 2013).  
 Resolution did not differ as the result of any of the other manipulations. 
There were non-significant interactions between frame and cycle, F(1, 84) = .61, p = 
.439, ηp2 = .007 and between scale and cycle, F(1, 84) = .004, p = .951, ηp2 < .001. 
There was a non-significant interaction between frame, scale, and cycle, F(1, 84) = 
.00, p = .996, ηp2  < .001. Hence resolution differed between cycles, but was 
minimally affected by manipulations of frame or scale. 
 
Discussion 
 The present study investigated the impact of manipulating measurement 
variables on metacognitive accuracy. Of greatest interest was whether JOL question 
frame would influence metacognitive accuracy. Based on previous research, three 
results from manipulating framing were considered plausible. It was predicted forget 
frames may produce greater JOL accuracy on both scales, that framing effects could 
be present on 0-100% scales but minimally affect binary tasks, or that framing would 
minimally affect JOL accuracy. None of these predictions were completely 
supported within the current study. Converging evidence for the effect of framing on 
multiple scales was not obtained, as binary measures may be more sensitive to the 
effects of framing. Responses on 0-100% scales most resemble Rhodes and Castel 
(2008) as there was minimal effect of framing. However, the effect of framing within 
binary conditions was not consistent with any of the previous framing literature 
reviewed. Hence a fourth possible pattern for the effect of framing was observed. 
Explanations for the effect of framing most resemble those of Serra and England 
(2012), as use of different anchoring may explain differences between frames. Yet 
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the relation between these anchors may be the opposite of what Serra and England 
predicted, as forget frame JOLs may be anchored lower than remember frame JOLs.   
 
Effect of Manipulations on Recall Performance and JOLs 
  Recall improved from cycle one to cycle two. This suggests learning 
occurred between the first and second recall tests, and confirms participants were 
engaging in the task. This finding is consistent with the testing effect (Karpicke & 
Roediger, 2008) and previous metacognitive literature which has shown improved 
recall in later cycles following cued recall of word-pairs (Hanczakowski et al., 2013; 
Serra & England, 2012). It also conforms with learning literature, which 
demonstrates restudy and repeated retrieval of information improves memory 
strength and facilitates recall of information (Dunlosky et al., 2013; Wiklund-
Hörnqvist et al., 2014). Neither framing nor scale type affected recall. This was 
expected, as these manipulations have been demonstrated to affect JOLs rather than 
memory performance (Finn, 2008; Hanczakowski et al., 2013). This finding is 
therefore consistent with previous literature (Finn, 2008; Hanczakowski et al., 2013). 
 In addition to greater recall, higher JOLs in cycle two indicates participants 
believed memory performance would be better in cycle two than cycle one. While 
JOLs differed significantly between cycles, this difference constituted only a small 
effect. This is in line with previous research, although a weaker effect 
(Hanczakowski et al., 2013). Overall results for recall and JOLs were therefore as 
expected. 
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Resolution 
 Resolution (relative accuracy) was greater in cycle two than cycle one. This 
suggests the ability to discriminate between items that would or would not be 
recalled improved following additional learning. Differences in resolution between 
cycle one and two are consistent with Hanczakowski et al. (2013), who found 
resolution increased across cycles on both scales. This finding is also consistent with 
research on the MPT heuristic, which suggests using information about previous 
memory performance can improve the ability to predict memory for the same 
information during subsequent tests (Finn & Metcalfe, 2008; Serra & Ariel, 2014). 
Resolution therefore benefited from additional study and testing, conforming with 
previous research (Hanczakowski et al., 2013; Koriat, 1997).  
 Significant differences in resolution were not observed following the 
manipulation of frame. This suggests framing does not change the relative accuracy 
of participant’s metacognitive decisions. For cycle one, this is consistent with Finn 
(2008), and Rhodes and Castel (2008), who found minimal differences in resolution 
between frames. However, when compared to multi-cycle studies such as Serra and 
England (2012), present results conflict somewhat. As within the current study, Serra 
and England found equivalent resolution under both frames during the first cycle. 
Yet unlike the present study, Serra and England found remember frames promoted 
greater resolution than forget frames in cycle two. Following their results, Serra and 
England proposed forget frames impaired use of the MPT heuristic.  
 Current results for resolution in cycle two conflict with this notion. Minimal 
differences in resolution between frames in cycle two may suggest framing does not 
affect use of the MPT heuristic. It is possible framing does not alter resolution, or 
provide cues towards discriminability. Alternatively, frames may provide cues about 
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resolution but participants did not rely upon them. Following the suggestion of Finn 
(2008), reliance upon cues believed to be most predictive of memory performance 
may reduce the use of other cues when making metacognitive decisions. Participants 
in the current study may therefore have believed the MPT heuristic was a better 
indication of memory performance than cues provided by framing. Hence framing 
may not influence the resolution of subsequent metacognitive decisions, while the 
MPT heuristic may explain why resolution improves between cycles. 
 
0-100% Scale Conditions  
 JOLs made on 0-100% scales were minimally influenced by framing, but did 
display the UWP effect. The effect of framing on 0-100% scale JOLs replicated the 
findings of Rhodes and Castel (2008). As within their study, framing had a minimal 
effect on metacognitive accuracy when a 0-100% scale was used. Regardless of 
frame, JOLs made on 0-100% scales replicated the UWP effect. JOLs were 
overconfident on initial testing, yet underconfident during the second cycle for both 
frames. Hence findings on 0-100% scales within the current study support the 
prediction there may be minimal effect of framing (Rhodes & Castel, 2008) and 
support hypotheses about the UWP effect (Koriat, Sheffer, & Ma’ayan, 2002).  
 Minimal differences between frames when JOLs were measured using 0-
100% scales may have resulted from how these judgements were made. Serra and 
England (2012) suggested framing may result from anchoring effects, with forget 
frames anchored at the midpoint and remember frames anchored between 20-40%. It 
is possible the way JOLs were made on 0-100% scales within the current study 
disrupted the formation of these frame related anchors. On 0-100% scales, a marker 
on a bar from 0 to 100 was moved to rate JOLs. This method was considered 
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beneficial to reduce typing errors. The method was also considered more sensitive, 
as subtle differences in responses may be missed if a scale with 10% increments was 
used. Yet it may have had unintended consequences on anchoring effects. As the 
marker always appeared in the middle of the bar (50%), it perhaps prompted 
participants to adopt an anchor at the same value. This visual cue may have resulted 
in participants considering this anchor as more salient or diagnostic than the anchors 
provided by framing effects. Hence the method of making 0-100% scale JOLs may 
have minimised the effects of framing. 
 To address this, future studies could replicate the method of the current 
experiment but require typed responses on 0-100% scales. However, it would be best 
to ensure only numbers between 0 and 100 were accepted. However, this method 
may also be more susceptible to participants restricting responses to increments of 
five or ten, or refraining from providing ratings at the extremes of the scale (Mickes, 
Hwe, Wais, & Wixted, 2011; Mickes, Wixted, & Wais, 2007). Hence researchers 
should be aware this method may result in participants failing the use the full range 
of the scale. Alternatively, it may be possible for the response bar to not have a 
marker, and the marker to only appear after the participant clicked to make their 
JOL. Minimal differences between frames following this correction would provide 
additional evidence for Rhodes and Castel’s (2008) finding framing minimally 
affects JOLs. Alternatively, it is possible this change will JOLs will differ between 
frames. Depending on the pattern of effects, this could be consistent with the binary 
condition results of the present study, or support Serra and England’s (2012) 
research. Changing how responses are provided on 0-100% scales would therefore 
allow investigation of whether methodological differences between scales produced 
results. 
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Binary Task Conditions 
 If multiple scales had not been included, it may have been concluded framing 
does not affect metacognitive accuracy. Instead, results from the binary conditions 
suggest framing is having an effect. JOLs made in the binary-remember condition 
displayed overconfidence in memory during the first cycle, but accurate predictions 
during the second cycle. Unlike remember frames, binary-forget JOLs displayed 
accurate predictions within the first cycle but a trend towards underconfidence 
within the second. Interestingly, binary results within the current study are almost 
the opposite of Serra and England’s (2012) findings on 0-100% scales (Serra and 
England found remember frames were well calibrated but became underconfident, 
while forget frames were overconfident but became well calibrated). Overall, while 
differences between frames were observed, results were not consistent with any of 
the predicted patterns. Hence this study conflicts with hypotheses about framing and 
provides a fourth pattern of effects. 
 Findings on binary measures have some implications for understanding the 
effect of scale type on the UWP effect (Hanczakowski et al., 2013; Koriat, Sheffer, 
& Ma’ayan, 2002). Consistent with Hanczakowski et al.’s (2013) results, the UWP 
effect was found on 0-100% scales but not on binary tasks. However, this pattern 
was only observable under a remember frame within the current study. Instead, a 
trend towards UWP within the binary-forget condition was observed within current 
results. This suggests an important boundary condition to Hanczakowski et al.’s 
findings; while the UWP effect may be eliminated by binary JOLs, this only applies 
if JOLs are made in a remember frame. What remains clear is differences between 
scales exist, and can influence the accuracy of some metacognitive decisions. Results 
therefore support Hanczakowski et al. and differing interpretations of the JOL 
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question depending on scale type, but only when considering judgements made 
under a remember frame. 
 One explanation of findings from binary tasks is that framing affects how 
difficult it is to make accurate metacognitive decisions. This idea resulted from 
literature on retrospective memory and eyewitness identifications. Retrospective 
memory is memory for information, events, or experiences encountered in the past 
(Kvavilashvili & Ford, 2014). Research in this area suggests people are better at 
determining information has been seen before (remember something has been 
encountered) than determining information has not been encountered (Weber & 
Brewer, 2004, 2006). Underpinning this finding is the idea it may be easier to collect 
memorial evidence a stimulus has been encountered than it is to determine a stimulus 
does not matches the memory of anything previously encountered (Weber & Brewer, 
2004, 2006).  
 Following these ideas, the framing effects observed within binary conditions 
could potentially be explained by differences in the difficulty of the metacognitive 
task. Overconfidence in memory may be produced if people find it easier to make 
accurate metacognitive decisions when asked to assess the likelihood of 
remembering. In comparison, if assessing the likelihood of forgetting is more 
difficult, it is possible this will lower confidence in memory or produce 
underconfidence. High confidence in the binary-remember condition, but 
underconfidence in the binary-forget condition could therefore be explained by 
differences in the difficulty of making metacognitive assessments. 
 Despite the intuitive relevance of theories relating to retrospective memory, it 
may not be applicable to the current study. These theories do not explain why 
framing did not affect both scales equally. Should assessing forgetting be more 
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difficult than assessing remembering, underconfidence should have been observed 
within the forget conditions of both scales. Additionally, judging whether something 
was encountered previously may rely upon different processes than predicting the 
likelihood of future recall. Theories relating to how difficult it is to assess memorial 
evidence may therefore be less relevant for judging future recall. Hence alternative 
explanations of findings are considered more plausible. 
 A more plausible explanation of binary task results could be the interaction of 
two factors; differences in anchoring and greater sensitivity of binary measures to 
framing effects. First, anchoring effects may underpin why there were differences in 
JOLs between framing conditions. Serra and England (2012) suggested the 
differences they found between frames resulted from use of different anchors. Based 
on their results, it was suggested forget frames were anchored higher (around 50%) 
than remember frames (anchored between 20 – 40%). However, results from the 
binary conditions of the current study suggest the opposite. As can be observed in 
cycle one of Figures 4 and 5, initial forget frame JOLs (M = 30.83) were 
significantly lower than initial remember frame JOLs (M = 48.70). Hence while SOJ 
were not conducted to identify the value of each anchor, initial JOLs on the binary 
scale suggest forget frames may be anchored comparatively lower than remember 
frames.   
 Use of different anchors could explain the observed binary results and 
provide a potential explanation of framing effects. Lower anchors for forget frames 
may have resulted in participants displaying reasonably accurate metacognitive 
judgements in the first cycle on binary scales. As anchoring results in minimal JOL 
change between cycles (Scheck & Nelson, 2005), lower anchors for forget frames 
compared to remember frames would explain why underconfidence was found in the 
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second cycle of the binary-forget condition. In comparison, higher anchors in the 
binary-remember frame may have promoted the overconfidence in memory observed 
within the first cycle. In the second cycle, well-calibrated judgements may have been 
due to memory accuracy coincidentally improving to the same level as the 
unchanged JOLs. Hence differences between frames may have been caused by the 
adoption of different anchors.  
 A second factor which could have contributed to results is differences caused 
by scales. This factor may explain why differing patterns of framing were observed 
between scales. Based on Hanczakowski et al.’s (2013) research, binary tasks may 
assess the probability of recall, while 0-100% scales assess confidence in recall. In 
addition to this, Finn (2008) suggests forget frames may promote JOL accuracy by 
increasing reliance on predictive memory cues. However, it should be noted minimal 
differences between forget and remember frames on 0-100% scales may indicate this 
idea is more fragile than Finn predicted. Following these two arguments, it is 
suggested framing effects on binary but not 0-100% scales indicates framing has 
greater influence on the probability of recall than confidence in recall. It is therefore 
possible binary scales may be more sensitive to the effects of framing than 0-100% 
scales. Differing effects of framing depending on scale type could therefore be 
explained by use of different anchors between frames, and binary tasks being more 
sensitive to framing.  
 
Implications  
 The study indicates simply getting students or clients to respond to a yes-no 
question about whether information is likely to be forgotten could promote accurate 
ratings of predicted memory performance. This may have practical implications for 
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health professionals, educators, or other professions where it is important clients are 
able to accurately recall information. Within all these settings, accurate 
metacognitive judgements are required to determine what information is known, and 
what may require future learning. Without a method to accurately assess this, it 
becomes difficult to identify when it is necessary to seek further information 
(Medina, Castleberry, & Persky, 2017). For example, people who are unable to 
accurately determine further learning is required may not gain all necessary health or 
drug information from their doctors. The current research suggests binary tasks 
under a forget frame may be a simple method to help people identify whether 
information will be recalled. While confirmation of findings is needed, binary-forget 
tasks may be a practical method for improving learning efficacy in health scenarios, 
education settings, and other real-world settings.  
 An additional implication of the current study is it highlights the need for 
further research into the effects of manipulating frames. Overall framing results 
differed distinctly from all previous framing research addressed within this paper. A 
fourth possible result of manipulating JOL question frame has therefore been 
observed, meaning conflicting results between framing studies remain. Hence the 
study highlights more research is needed to establish a pattern of effects of framing. 
Such research could follow the method of Serra and England’s (2012) paper, as 
collecting both JOL and SOJ could provide deeper understanding of anchoring 
effects. Inclusion of both binary tasks and 0-100% scales would be beneficial, as the 
present study highlights the effect of framing can differ depending on the measure 
used. Doing so may provide additional evidence that framing does not affect 
anchoring. Alternatively, such research may replicate the pattern of anchoring 
observed within either the present study or Serra and England’s study. Such research 
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would be beneficial as it could improve understanding of the impact of manipulating 
framing. 
  The present study adds three ideas to current understanding of the effects of 
measurement variables on JOL accuracy. First, the study builds on ideas such as 
Prospect Theory by suggesting the way JOL assessments are framed can also 
influence the answers participants provide. Second, the effects of framing may result 
from forget frames promoting comparatively lower anchors than remember frames. 
Finally, the study adds to research on differences between scales by indicating binary 
tasks may be more sensitive to framing than 0-100% scales. Collectively, these ideas 
indicate the accuracy of metacognitive assessments such as JOLs can be influenced 
by how they are measured. These three findings add to the current understanding of 
metacognition, and indicate methods of metacognitive assessment should be 
carefully designed to promote accurate judgments and decrease cognitive biases. 
 A final implication of the present study relates to how future research may be 
conducted. Following recommendations from Hanczakowski et al. (2013), the study 
provides evidence that examining the results of manipulations on multiple scales can 
improve the understanding of effects. In relation to framing, no effect of framing was 
found on 0-100% scales. As previous framing literature has only considered 0-100% 
scales, the present study adds information about how the result of manipulating 
framing changes depending on scale type. The disparity between framing effects on 
different scales highlights it may be premature to make conclusions about a 
manipulation without considering converging evidence from multiple scales. The 
present study therefore highlights that inclusion of multiple scales could be a 
valuable tool for gathering converging evidence and investigating the true effect of 
manipulations on metacognitive accuracy. It may therefore have implications for 
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future research. This research could assess whether manipulating the difficulty of the 
recall task (Scheck & Nelson, 2005) or delaying JOLs (van Loon et al., 2013) 
provides similar results on binary tasks to what has previously been observed on 0-
100% scales. Such research would provide v information on the implications of and 
mechanisms behind such manipulations. 
 
Limitations  
 A limitation of the current and other framing studies is how remember and 
forget frames were compared. Within the present study, forget frames were 
converted to the same scale as remember frames by reverse scoring forgetting. This 
transformation was believed necessary to directly compare frames. The same method 
was used within previous framing studies (Finn, 2008; Rhodes & Castel, 2008; Serra 
& England, 2012). However, forgetting and remembering may not be direct 
opposites (Roediger, Dudai, & Fitzpatrick, 2007). Instead, it is possible each 
judgment may require different information, or represent the assessment of different 
outcomes (Roediger et al., 2007). Conducting this transformation therefore ignores 
the possibility forgetting and remembering may not be fundamentally opposites (i.e. 
that forgetting may not be equal to 1 – the likelihood of remembering). As such, it 
may be beneficial to consider the effects of each frame separately rather than 
converting frames to the same scale. Future framing research may therefore benefit 
from an alternate method of comparing frames.  
 A second potential limitation of the present study relates to poor recall 
performance. Low recall scores could potentially indicate the recall task is too 
complicated, perhaps making it too difficult for participants to differentiate between 
what would and would not be recalled. Poor resolution in cycle one (M = 0.09) and 
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cycle two (M = 0.16), and poor recall performance (M = 25.48) in cycle one may 
support this notion. However, low recall scores within the first cycle are common 
within metacognition literature. Using the same word list and similar word-pair 
presentation time (4 seconds) as the present study, Serra and England (2012, 
experiment 1) found recall was under 30% for both frames during the first cycle. 
Likewise, Finn (2008) found mean recall was 17% (SE = 2) under a remember frame 
and 19% (SE = 3) for forget frames when completing a task akin to the current study. 
Poor recall in the first cycle of the present study (25.47%) is therefore comparable to 
results on similar metacognitive tasks. In addition, both resolution and recall 
performance did improve between cycles. This indicates the task was not so difficult 
it prevented learning or improvements to the ability in resolution. Hence poor recall 
in the first cycle should not be considered a limitation.   
 A final limitation is it remains unclear whether the method of assessing JOLs 
promoted differences in metacognitive accuracy, or simply altered the ability to 
translate beliefs about recall likelihood onto an external scale. Based on the current 
study, it is possible differences may have greater relation to changes in reporting 
than changes to metacognitive accuracy. Yet this idea was not explicitly explored in 
the current study, and further investigation into this idea is required. Regardless, 
results do suggest the method of assessment affects the JOL ratings given. Further 
investigation of why this occurs would be beneficial to clarify this distinction. 
 
Concluding Comments 
 The present study provides support for the notion both the way metacognitive 
questions are framed, and the scale used to measure such judgements can affect the 
accuracy of immediate JOL decisions. Despite Hanczakowski et al.’s (2013) finding 
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the UWP effect occur on 0-100% scales but not binary measures, the current 
research was only able to replicate this pattern within remember frames. The theory 
scales promote either a probability or confidence interpretation of JOL questions 
may therefore be less robust than originally predicted. Results were not consistent 
with any of the previous framing studies addressed, hence highlighting the need for 
more research to clarify conflicting findings. Framing within the current study could 
be explained by lower anchors within forget than remember frames, and greater 
sensitively of binary tasks to the effects of framing.  
While methodological differences between scales was considered a less 
plausible explanation of results, it cannot be completely dismissed. The study may 
also be limited by how remember and forget frames were compared. Future studies 
could correct these issue by changing the methods of assessing JOLs on 0-100% 
scales, and developing an alternate method of comparing frames. The study has 
theoretical implications for research into both framing and scale effects on 
immediate JOLs, and highlights the need to establish a pattern of effects in both 
areas. Most importantly, the study reveals the recorded accuracy of metacognitive 
decisions can depend on the measure used. Research into and development of 
methods to accurately assess metacognition in both real-word and research settings is 
therefore necessary.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Ethics Approval  
 Email received from Katherine Shaw (katherine.shaw@utas.edu.au) on Wednesday 
15th March 2017 at 2:11 pm.  
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Appendix B: Participant Information and Consent Sheet 
You are invited to participate in a study investigating metacognition. Metacognition 
is our ability to think about our thinking. This includes making judgments about how 
well we have learnt information, and our confidence in our memory. 
 This study is being conducted by Rachel Breen as part of an Honours Degree at the 
University of Tasmania. Matthew Palmer is supervising the study. To speak with the 
researchers please contact either Rachel Breen (rjbreen@utas.edu.au; Ph: 03 6324 
3004) or Matthew Palmer (matt.palmer@utas.edu.au; Ph: 03 6324 3004). 
1.      What is the purpose of this study? 
The purpose of this study is to investigate how well people make metacognitive 
decisions. This study will help inform researchers about how these decisions are 
made, and will help inform future research. 
2.      Why have I been invited to participate? 
We are seeking volunteers to participate in the study. Anyone over the age of 18 with 
normal or corrected to normal vision can participate. 
3.      What will I be asked to do? 
You will be asked to complete a series of tasks which involve learning and being 
tested on a list of word pairs. As part of this, you will be asked about your 
confidence in your memory. Tasks will be completed individually on a provided 
computer. The study will take approximately 60 minutes to complete. 
4.      Are there any possible benefits from participation in this study? 
Participating in this study is a great opportunity to see how research works. In 
addition, your participation will help researchers gain a better understanding of 
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memory and metacognition. This information can help guide future research and 
investigate ways to help people learn more effectively. 
You will also be offered either financial compensation or course credit in return for 
your time. First year psychology students will be offered either 60 minutes course 
credit or $20. Those not enrolled in first year psychology will be offered $20 as a 
thank you for your time. 
5.      Are there any possible risks from participation in this study? 
There are no anticipated risks from participating in this study. The potential for the 
experiment to cause harm is expected to be minimal. Should support be required 
following the study, free counselling services can be contacted on the Mental Health 
Hotline: 1800 332 388 (Tasmania) or Lifeline: 13 11 14 (National). Current students 
can also access free counselling services at the University of Tasmania (Launceston: 
03 6324 3787; Cradle Coast: 03 6430 4947). 
6.      What if I change my mind during or after the study? 
You are free to withdraw from the study at any time without explanation. There will 
be no negative consequences if you decide to leave. 
7.      What will happen to the information when this study is over? 
All data will be anonymous. No identifying information will be collected from 
participants.  Data will be kept on a secure computer at the University of Tasmania. 
Only the researchers will have access to it. Following the completion of the study, 
data will be kept for a period of five years. After this time, all data will be archived. 
8.      How will the results of the study be published? 
The results of this study will be presented verbally at a presentation day and in the 
honours thesis as per the requirements of the Honours degree. Data will be de-
identified; you will not be able to be identified based on data presented. A summary 
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of results will be available on the University of Tasmania’s website 
(http://www.utas.edu.au/psychology/research/research-project-reports) following the 
completion of the study. 
9.      What if I have questions about this study? 
If at any point you wish to speak with the researchers, you may contact either Rachel 
Breen (rjbreen@utas.edu.au; Ph: 03 6324 3004) or Matthew Palmer 
(matt.palmer@utas.edu.au; Ph: 03 6324 3004). This study has been approved by the 
Tasmanian Social Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee. If you have 
concerns or complaints about the conduct of this study, please contact the Executive 
Officer of the HREC (Tasmania) Network by phone (+61 3 6226 6254) or email 
(human.ethics@utas.edu.au). The Executive Officer is the person nominated to 
receive complaints from research participants. Please quote the ethics reference 
number H0012660. 
 
□ I have read and understood the information provided about this study, and I 
consent to participating. [Ticking this box was required to move to the next page and 
begin the study].  
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Appendix C: Demographic Questions  
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Appendix D: Word Pairs  
BufferA Arm - Market    
BufferB Icebox - Acrobat    
BufferC Banner - Nun    
PAIR01 Macaroni - Bar    
PAIR02 Barrel -   Star    
PAIR03 Beast - Fabric    
PAIR04 Vest - Bird    
PAIR05 Blister - Cabin    
PAIR06 Daffodil -  Blood    
PAIR07 Blossom - Locker    
PAIR08 Rattle - Board    
PAIR09 Lawn - Book    
PAIR10 Piston - Boulder    
PAIR11 Pelt - Brain 
PAIR12 Bronze - Whale    
PAIR13 Bullet - Yacht    
PAIR14 Candy - Prairie    
PAIR15 Cat - Jury    
PAIR16 Cellar - Elbow    
PAIR17 Woods - Chin    
PAIR18 Church - Mammal    
PAIR19 Claw - Salad    
PAIR20 Jail - Coffee   
PAIR21 Glacier - Cord    
PAIR22 Corn - Planet 
PAIR23 Cotton - Reptile    
PAIR24 Diamond - Umbrella    
PAIR25 Monarch - Doll    
PAIR26 Door - Officer    
PAIR27 Slipper - Dove    
PAIR28 Ticket - Dummy    
PAIR29 Sunburn - Elephant    
PAIR30 Flag - Window    
PAIR31 Flesh - Kettle    
PAIR32 Foam - Meadow    
PAIR33 Suds -  Fowl    
PAIR34 Potato - Frog    
PAIR35 Fur - Oats    
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PAIR36 Glass - Journal    
PAIR37 Volcano - Hammer    
PAIR38 Lake - Harp    
PAIR39 Hillside - Revolver    
PAIR40 Poet - Home    
PAIR41 Hoof - Slave   
PAIR42 Hotel - Noose    
PAIR43 Harness - Snake    
PAIR44 Ink - Lark    
PAIR45 Iron - Leopard    
PAIR46 Juggler - Mast    
PAIR47 Leaflet - Tower   
PAIR48 Seat - Letter    
PAIR49 Doctor - Lobster    
PAIR50 Lump - Wine 
PAIR51 Bowl - Missile    
PAIR52 Mountain - Skin    
PAIR53 String - Mule    
PAIR54 Oven - Ship    
PAIR55 Toy - Pencil    
PAIR56 Python - Building    
WP57  Spinach - Typhoon    
WP58  Sugar - Prison 
WP59  Corpse - Forest    
WP60  Fox - Pudding    
BufferD Butter - Hospital   
BufferE Person - Storm    
BufferF Fire - Apple
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Appendix E: Task Instructions 
WELCOME 
[Demographics Questions Presented] 
Before beginning this study, please make sure your environment is as distraction free 
as possible. For example, it would be best to either put your mobile phone on silent 
or turn it off to ensure it will not distract you. Many of the components of this study 
are timed. You will not be able to pause the study after it has begun. 
In this study, you will be shown word-pairs containing two English words. For 
example: 
photo  -  table 
(Cue word)              (Target word) 
Your task is to learn these words to the best of your ability in preparation for a test. 
You will be given 3.5 seconds to study each word-pair. 
 
During the test, you will be shown the first word in the pair, and will be asked to 
type the second word. After you study each word-pair, you will be asked to indicate 
whether you are likely to forget the second word when the first English word is 
presented in the upcoming test.  
 
[For the binary-forget condition] You will be asked to respond by selecting either 
“Yes" or "No", whereby: 
Yes means you are likely to forget, 
And No means you are not likely to forget. 
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[For the binary-remember condition] You will be asked to respond by selecting 
either “Yes” or “No”, whereby: 
Yes means you are likely to remember, 
And No means you are not likely to remember. 
 
[For the scale-remember condition]: You will be asked to rate how likely you are to 
remember on a scale from 0% - 100%, whereby: 
0% means you are not likely to remember, 
And 100% means you are very likely to remember. 
 
[For the scale-forget condition]: You will be asked to rate how likely you are to 
forget on a scale from 0%-100%, whereby: 
0% means you are not likely to forget, 
And 100% means you are likely to forget. 
 
When you are ready to begin the study phase, click next. 
 
[Word-Pairs Cycle One Presented] 
 
Now you have 2 minutes to solve as many of the following maths problems as 
possible. Please enter your answers in the correct order in the box below. Separate 
each answer with a comma ( , ). 
 
[Filler Task One Presented] 
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You will now undergo a test to see how many of the word pairs you can remember. 
During the test, the first word will be displayed and you will be asked to type the 
second word of the pair. This part of the study is not timed, and you may take as 
long as you like. If you do not know the answer, you may type “X” to indicate this. 
Once you are satisfied with your answer, press NEXT to move to the next screen. 
 
[Cued Recall Task Presented] 
 
You now have a two-minute break before the beginning of the next part of the study. 
Please take this time to stretch and relax. The study will resume automatically after 
two minutes has elapsed. 
 
You will now be given the opportunity to study the word-pairs again in preparation 
for a final test. You will be given 3.5 seconds to study each word-pair. During the 
test, you will be shown the first word in the pair, and will be asked to type the 
second word. 
 
After you study each word-pair, you will be asked to rate how likely it is you will 
remember/forget the second word when the first word is presented in the upcoming 
test.   
 
When you are ready to begin the restudy phase, click next. 
 
[Word-Pairs Cycle Two Presented] 
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 Now you have 2 minutes to solve as many of the following maths problems 
as possible. Please enter your answers in the correct order in the box below. Separate 
each answer with a comma ( , ). 
 
[Filler Task Two Presented] 
 
You will now undergo the final test to see how many of the word pairs you can 
remember. During the test, the first word will be displayed and you will be asked to 
type the second word of the pair. This part of the study is not timed, and you may 
take as long as you like. If you do not know the answer, you may type “X” to 
indicate this. Once you are satisfied with your answer, press NEXT to move to the 
next screen. 
 
[Cued Recall Task Presented] 
 
Thank you for your participation. Your time is very much appreciated.  
 
 
